

(http://fortinet.com/)



### New Version Of NgrBot Wipes Hard Drives

by Ne Xu (http://blog.fortinet.com/author/he-xu) | July 10, 2014 | Category: Security Research (http://blog.fortinet.com/category/security-research)

0 4 4 Google + 0

NgrBot is a modified IrcBot. It has the capability to join different Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channels to perform various attacks according to the IRC-based commands from the command-and-control (C&C) server. Recently, our botnet monitoring system captured an NgrBot variant with hardcoded version 1.1.0.0.




Figure 1, Hardcoded version 1,1,0,0.

This new version of the bot carries new features that are much more harmful than before, including the ability to destroy data in the user's hard drive.

# Wiping The Hard Drive

This new version of the bot has added a destructive function that overwrites the hard drive of the compromised system.

This wiping behavior is triggered if there is any kind of failure in the decryption of its strings. When decrypting, NgrBot uses a string structure where the first dword is a pointer to an RC4-encrypted string; the second dword is the string length; and the third dword is the decrypted string's CRC32 value.

The figure below shows some of these string structures, before and after decryption.




Figure 2. String structures.

After decrypting all the strings, it adds all the CRC32 hashes of the decrypted strings and compares it against a value that is stored at the end of the encrypted string structure list. If it does not match, it creates a new thread that calls the DeviceIoControl API to lock the hard disk, then calls WriteFile to write the first 0x200 bytes with 0x00s.

September 2015 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2015/09)	2
August 2015 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2015/08)	17
July 2015 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2015/07)	22
June 2015 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2015/06)	18
May 2015 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2015/05)	16
April 2015 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2015/04)	34
March 2015 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2015/03)	17
February 2015 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2015/02)	11
January 2015 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2015/01)	16
December 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/12)	7
November 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/11)	19
October 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/10)	16
September 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/09)	11
August 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/08)	11
July 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/07)	20
June 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/06)	21
May 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/05)	19
April 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/04)	16
March 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/03)	20
February 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/02)	15
January 2014 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2014/01)	25
December 2013 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2013/12)	10
November 2013 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2013/11)	15
October 2013	19

```
; hTemplateFile
; dwFlagsAndAttributes
push
push
                                 dwCreationDisposition
                                 lpSecurityAttributes
dwShareHode
push
push
           0C 00000000h
                                 dwDesiredAccess
          offset a_Physicaldrive :
                                           NAMA AAPBYSICALDRIUED
push
          [ebp+var_A], 55h
[ebp+var_9], BAAh
ds:CreateFileA
nov
call
          esi, eax
esi, OFFFFFFFh
short loc_409F2A
cnp
push
nov
           edi, ds:DeviceloControl
                               ; 1pOverlapped
push
           edx, [ebp+BytesReturned]
lea
                               ; lpBytesReturned
push
          edx
push
                                 nOutBufferSize
push
                               : 1pOutBuffer
: nInBufferSize
push
push
                               ; lplnBuffer
          FSCTL LOCK VOLUME ; dwloControlCode esi ; hDevice
push
push
call
          edi : DeviceloControl
          0 ; 1pOverlapped eax, [ebp+NumberOfBytesWritten]
push
                              ; 1pHumberOfBytesWritten
; nHumberOfBytesToWrite
push
          PAX
push
          200h
lea
          ecx, [ebp+Buffer]
push
          ecx
                                 1pBuffer 	←
                                                 - contains 0x00s
call
          ds:WriteFile
push
lea
                               ; lpOverlapped
          edx, [ebp+BytesReturned]
                              ; lpBytesReturned
; nOutBufferSize
push
          edx
push
push
                                 1pOutBuffer
push
                                 nInBufferSize
push
                               1plnBuffer
          FSCTL UHLOCK VOLUME ; dvloControlCode esi ; hDevice
push
push
call
          edi : DeviceloControl
push
call
          esi
                              ; hObject
          ds:CloseHandle
```

Figure 3. Code for wiping the hard disk.

Aside from filling the partition with zeroes, the bot displays the following message box to indicate its displeasure:



Figure 4. Message box displayed when CRC32 hash doesn't match.

The figure below shows what the overwritten hard disk sector looks like.

September 2013 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2013/09)	19
August 2013 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2013/08)	14
July 2013 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2013/07)	14
June 2013 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2013/06)	2
April 2013 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2013/04)	1
March 2013 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2013/03)	12
February 2013 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2013/02)	11
January 2013 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2013/01)	12
December 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/12)	8
November 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/11)	7
October 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/10)	4
September 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/09)	6
August 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/08)	7
July 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/07)	62
June 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/06)	17
May 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/05)	14
April 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/04)	15
March 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/03)	14
February 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/02)	11
January 2012 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2012/01)	6
December 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/12)	4
November 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/11)	6
October 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/10)	11
September 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/09)	2
August 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/08)	2
July 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/07)	4
June 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/06)	6
May 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/05)	6
April 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/04)	5
March 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/03)	7




Figure 5. Wiped hard disk sector.

When the system restarts, the victim's system will hang and will be unable to boot.

#### Preventing AV Access

Another feature of this new version is the blocking of access to antivirus-related web sites.

To do this, the bot injects code into running processes and hooks the following APIs:

- DnsQuery\_A (from dnsapi.dll)
- DnsQuery\_W (from dnsapi.dll)
- GetAddrInfoW (from ws2\_32.dll)

When these APIs are called, the hooking functions check if the address to connect to contains strings that are in the bot's blacklist, which is shown in the following figure:

February 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/02)	10
January 2011 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2011/01)	88
December 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/12)	8
November 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/11)	1
October 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/10)	33
September 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/09)	975
August 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/08)	79
July 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/07)	100
June 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/06)	
May 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/05)	200
April 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/04)	1
March 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/03)	1000
February 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/02)	
January 2010 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2010/01)	
December 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/12)	
November 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/11)	(
October 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/10)	6
September 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/09)	3
August 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/08)	
July 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/07)	
June 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/06)	0.00
May 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/05)	4
April 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/04)	
March 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/03)	9
February 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/02)	4
January 2009 (http://blog.fortinet.com/2009/01)	1

```
DATA ZRIF: Anti_antiVirus+237r
"virustatal."
 dd offset aVirustotal_
 dd offset aMovirusthanks_; "novirusThanks."
dd offset aThreatexpert_; "threatexpert."
dd offset aThreatexpert_ dd offset aJotti_ dd offset aUiruschief_ dd offset aUiruschief_ dd offset aUirscan_ dd offset a
                                                     "jotti."
                                                      wirmschief.
                                                      "garyshood."
"Girstan."
dd offset alseclab_
dd offset aTrendmicro_
                                                     "iseclar."
                                                     "Drendniero.
dd offset aKaspersky_
dd offset aEset_
dd offset aBitdefender_
                                                     "kaspersky."
                                                      "bitdefemmer."
dd offset aflug_
dd offset afluira
                                                     wira.
dd offset aAvast_
dd offset aComodo_
dd offset aSymantec
                                                     'Eumodo.
                                                     symmter
dd offset allcafee_
dd offset allcanan_
                                                    "nurman
dd offset aNorton
                                                    "morton.
dd offset aSunbeltsoftwar ; "sunbeltsoftware."
dd offset aMalwarebytes_ ; "salwarebytes."
dd offset aSophos_ ; "sophos."
dd offset aPandasecurity : "pandasecurity."
dd offset aClamav : "clamav."
dd offset aBullguard
dd offset aFSecure
dd offset aOnecare_live
                                                 : "bullgoard."
: "Frsecure."
                                                  ; "anecare.live."
dd offset aOnlinemalwares; "onlinemalwarescanner."
dd offset aEnsisoft___; "ensisoft."
dd offset aHeck_tc
dd offset aOnlinemalwares : "Onlinemalwarescammer."
dd offset aLavasoft : "lagasoft."
dd offset aPrecisesecurit; "precisesecurity."
dd offset aUirus ; "oirus."
dd offset aGdatasoftware_; "gdatasoftware."
dd offset aUirusbuster_np; "virusbuster.mprotect."
dd offset aFortinet_ ; "fortinet."
dd offset aWebroot_ ; "webroot."
```

Figure 6. Blacklist of AV companies.

These strings are included in most web sites of major antivirus vendors. If the hooked APIs find any of these strings, access to those sites are blocked.

#### Connecting To The C&C Server

As mentioned above, NgrBot is an IRC server. It connects to an IRC channel in order to receive commands from its CSC concer.

The following is the full list of C&C server commands that the current variant supports.

- :~dw
- · :~http.inj
- · :~http.int
- · :~http.set
- :~j
- · :~logins
- :~m
- :~mdns:~mod
- · :~msn.int
- · :~msn.set
- · :~nhb
- :~p
- :~pu
- :~rc
- :~rs0
- :~rs1
- · :~s
- · :~slow
- · :~speed
- :~ssyn
- · :~stop

- · :~udp
- :~us
- · :~v
- :~vf
- · :~vs

The network traffic that we have captured from this version still looks very similar to the previous one. So far, we have captured only two commands that are being sent from the C&C server. In the figure below, the botnet commands: ~pu and: ~dw can be seen in the IRC commands that begin with: 001:Network 332.

```
DoIN evida mujojn
...nusivea)dabenn' dabpopr@crew-DOCDD146_beabe(a.telus.net 101N:evida
1001.etevnck 332 fl(uSa)kPa)dabpopr evida 1-pu fltp://www.med
1001.etevnck 332 fl(uSa)kPa)dabpopr evida googre 1404342562
1001.etevnck 353 fl(uSa)kPa)dabpopr evida googre 1404342562
1001.etevnck 302 fl(uSa)kPa)dabpopr evida googre 1404342562
1001.etevnck 303 fl(uSa)kPa)dabpopr exp 1404342562
1001.etevnck 303 fl(uSa)kPa)dabpopr exp 1404342562
1001.etevnck 333 fl(uSa)kPa)dabpopr exp 1404342562
1001.etevnck 333 fl(uSa)kPa)dabpopr exp 1404342562
1001.etevnck 333 fl(uSa)kPa)dabpopr exp 1404342562
```

Figure 7. Captured C&C commands.

Currently, we are seeing the use of these commands in order to spread other bots, such as Andromeda (http://blog.fortinet.com/New-Anti-Analysis-Tricks-In-Andromeda-2-08/), Neurevt (http://blog.fortinet.com/Round-3--More-Neurevt-DDoS-Attacks/), and Lethic (http://blog.fortinet.com/From-Spammer-To-Clicker/).

## Why NgrBot?

Before we end, one might wonder why this bot is called NgrBot. The answer is that this is the name that the malware author has given, as seen in the binary code.

```
push offset aRunning ; "running" push offset aHgrbot : "ngeBot" call sub_4073E0 add esp, 8 cmp eax, 1 jnz short loc_41009E push 0 ; uExitCode call ds:ExitProcess
```

Figure 8. Hardcoded bot name.

## Conclusion

With our brief analysis of this active version of NgrBot, we can now understand its new features, especially the more dangerous one of hard disk wiping. We will continue to do our best in capturing the new active commands. As botnets continue their activies, so will our botnet monitoring system's tracking of their actions.

by He Xu (http://blog.fortinet.com/author/he-xu) | July 10, 2014 | Category: Security Research (http://blog.fortinet.com/category/security-research)

Tags: botnet (http://blog.fortinet.com/tag/botnet) Neurevt (http://blog.fortinet.com/tag/neurevt) bot (http://blog.fortinet.com/tag/neurevt) bot Andromeda (http://blog.fortinet.com/tag/andromeda) hard disk wiping (http://blog.fortinet.com/tag/hard-disk-wiping) anti-AV (http://blog.fortinet.com/tag/anti-av)

comments powered by Disqus (http://disqus.com/)

Fortinet Blog (http://blog.fortinet.com/) Corporate How to Buy Products Service & Support Find a Reseller Product Family FortiCare Support (http://www.facebook.com/fortinet) (http://fortinet.com/aboutus/aboutus/mitiply/fortinet.com/partners/reseller\_(http://fortinet.com/aboutus/index.html)p://fortinet.com/support/forticare\_support/index.html) (http://www.twitter.com/fortinet) Investor Relations FortiPartner Program Certifications Support Helpdesk (http://www.youtube.com/user/SecureNetworks) (http://fortinet.com/partners/partner\_(http://fortinet\_com/partners/partner\_(http://fortinet\_com/partners/partner\_(http://fortinet\_com/partners/partner\_(http://fortinet\_com/partners/partner\_(http://fortinet\_com/partners/partner\_(http://fortinet\_com/partners/partner\_(http://fortinet\_com/partners/partner\_(http://fortinet\_com/partners/partner\_(http://fortinet\_com/partners/partner\_(http://fortinet\_com/partners/partner\_(http://fortinet\_com/partners/partn (http://investor.fortinet.com/) (http://www.linkedin.com/company/fortinet) (http://fortinet.com/rss.) Careers

Try & Buy

Awards

FortiGuard Center

(http://jobs.fortinet.com/) (http://fortinet.com/how\_to\_buy/try\_**sindo**bi/synthet)com/aboutus/fortinet\_**siddyas/sages/awak.cds/shi/**mil)

Press Room Fortinet Store Video Library

(http://fortinet.com/press\_releases/plesspablissibre.fortinet.com/) (http://video.fortinet.com/)

(http://fortinet.com/partners/index.html)

Global Offices

(http://fortinet.com/aboutus/locations.html)

(http://blog.fortinet.com/)

Fortinet in the News

(http://fortinet.com/aboutus/media/news.html)

Events

(http://fortinet.com/events/index.html)

Contact Us

(http://fortinet.com/contact\_us/index.html)

Copyright © 2015 Fortinet, Inc. All Rights Reserved. | Terms of Service (http://blog.fortinet.com/aboutus/legal.html) | Privacy (http://blog.fortinet.com/aboutus/privacy.html)